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AFRICA TRAPPED IN GEO-POLITICAL COMPETITION

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Expanding internet connectivity is not a new issue in Africa. Despite some progress, notably in internet coverage, the growing usage gap (access to the internet, but the inability to use it) has been steadily increasing. In sub-Saharan Africa, it went from 36 per cent in 2014 to 49 per cent in 2015, which is twice the global average. This is because of several factors, including the affordability of data and handsets, as well as digital literacy. 

The COVID-19 pandemic further galvanised the debate on connectivity in Africa. In connected regions of the world, accessible, reliable and affordable internet allowed children to continue their education uninterrupted. In contrast, by some estimates, 250-million primary and secondary school children were temporarily forced out of school in Africa as a result of lockdowns. 

Internet access gave respite to some sectors of the economy, thanks to a well-developed e-commerce industry. This allowed many employers to shift work from the office to the living rooms of their employees when possible, thus contributing to reducing human movement and increasing the effectiveness of lockdowns, while maintaining their businesses activities. The psychological effects of lockdowns were also mitigated as much as possible through connectivity, which not only provided entertainment, but also video links with family and friends.  

It is, thus, difficult to imagine a discussion on Africa’s ‘post-COVID-19’ recovery that excludes affordable and reliable internet access as a key priority. But digital transformation is not a neutral space and policy choices on how to implement the digital agenda in Africa are bound to be shaped by the geopolitical tech war between China and the west.  

Although reliable data is scarce, it is estimated that 70 per cent  of Africa’s 4G infrastructure relies on Huawei technology. The Silk Road initiative further contributes to entrenching this position. Until former United States President Donald Trump introduced a ban on the use of Huawei technologies in the US, it was assumed that it made financial sense for African countries to build on pre-existing 4G infrastructure, when possible, and thus maintain its ties with Huawei. Indeed, even in the European Union, which has more diverse telecommunications infrastructure, the possible exclusion of Huawei technologies would cost its telecommunications sector an estimated additional US$62 billion to roll out its 5G network and would delay rollout plans by 18 months.

Break

Although the ban in the US did not discourage some (including Rain, South Africa’s data-only mobile network to launch the first commercial standalone 5G network in Africa using Huawei technologies), it did put a break on the plans of several large internet providers across the continent. Earlier this month, Safaricom, East Africa’s largest telecommunications company, announced that it would be putting its 5G rollout in Kenya on hold. Although the company officially cited a change of strategy (focus on converting more clients to 2G, 3G and 4G), the question remains of whether the fact that Kenya’s 5G network was built by Huawei played a role in the company’s decision. 

Other large African telecommunication companies, which have financial links to countries in the west such as the UK, have also sought to diversify their providers to avoid future challenges. MTN  has, for instance, pivoted towards Sweden’s Ericsson to launch its 5G network in some South African cities and elsewhere on the continent such as in Benin. Telma Madagascar also opted for Ericsson. And Finland’s Nokia also secured a three-year deal with Togocom to build the country’s 5G network. But Huawei remains the major provider on the continent on account of its cost and pre-existing footprint. 

Concerns about international pressure on Huawei and its effects on the speed of African countries’ conversion to 5G have led some African leaders to react openly. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa noted, for instance, “We cannot afford to have our economy to be held back because of this fight (between the US and China).” Indications that the Biden administration will maintain aspects of the Trump policy towards China, including on technology, means that African countries are likely to continue to feel the heat from the tech war. 

‘Digital sovereignty’

But infrastructure is only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the debate about digital transformation. Just as critical is the use of data and standards; in other words, how the infrastructure of the internet works, how content is used and how mobile devices communicate. The EU is one region that understood this early on, so much so that the bloc now openly speaks of ‘digital sovereignty’. Put simply, ‘digital sovereignty’ is about a triangle: Who builds the infrastructure and the hardware to use it; who controls the data, especially with the projected rise of the internet of things and artificial intelligence (AI); and who sets the standards. In the words of the European Council on Foreign Relations: ‘referees do not win the game’.



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